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Demographic Research 19: 1883-1912. 
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Jenny Higgins2
Abstract  
An analysis published in a recent edition of this journal (Puur, Olah, Tazi-Preve, and 
Dorbritz 2008) reported that, in eight European countries, men with egalitarian gender 
attitudes both desired and had more children than men with more traditional gender 
attitudes. These unexpected findings led us to explore a similar research question with 
an alternate dataset--the European/World Value Surveys. But we found--without 
exception--a negative association between men’s egalitarian attitudes and fertility, not 
only in the selected European countries but also in a considerable number of other 
developed countries. We explore possible reasons for and implications of these 
divergent findings. 
 
1 Princeton University, USA. E-mail: westoff@princeton.edu. 
2 Princeton University, USA. E-mail: jennyh@princeton.edu. 
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1. Introduction  
This paper was prompted by an analysis published in a recent edition of this journal 
(Puur, Olah, Tazi-Preve, and Dorbritz 2008) that showcased a provocative and 
potentially important finding. The authors explored cultural attitudes toward men’s 
social roles and their connections with men’s desired fertility in eight European 
countries. According to their measures, those men with more egalitarian gender 
attitudes both “desire[d] a higher number of children” and “realize[d] these plans by 
their late 30s and early and mid-40s, fathering more children than traditional men” 
(Puur et al. 2008, page 1901). The authors conclude that “egalitarian men seem to be 
pro-family indeed” (page 1901), which, “in the long run, [...] may indicate some 
positive prospects for Europe’s fertility development” (page 1902). 
Despite several exceptions (Kaufman 2000; Philipov 2008; Tazi-Preve, 
Bichlbauer, and Gougon 2004), the previous literature overwhelmingly has associated 
more egalitarian gender role attitudes with lower rather than higher fertility. In contrast, 
if the findings of Puur et al. are reliable and generalizeable to other European countries, 
one might conclude that low fertility of the more developed countries may be reversing 
as egalitarian gender attitudes increase and people’s views of men’s roles change.   
In light of the potential significance of these unexpected findings for the future 
level of fertility, we sought to explore the authors’ measures more closely and to seek 
confirmation of their reported association with fertility from other data sources.    
 
 
2. Summary of Puur et al.’s data and measures  
Data from the published article come from the 2002-2005 DIALOG project (Höhn, 
Avramov, and Kotowska 2008). Puur et al. limited their analyses to men aged 20-44 in 
Austria, Estonia, East and West Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, and Poland, 
based on surveys conducted between 2001 and 2003.   
As a proxy for more general gender attitudes, the authors focused on perceptions 
of men’s social roles, as assessed by the following three statements: 
 
1) It is not good if the man stays at home and cares for the children and the 
woman goes out to work. 
2) Family life often suffers because men concentrate too much on their 
work. 
3) For a man the job should be more important than the family. 
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The authors constructed a summary index based on the extent of respondents’ 
agreement with these statements (the middle item was reversed to be consistent with the 
direction of the scale). The authors assessed men’s gender attitudes with this scale, with 
a high summary score indicating a more egalitarian position and a low score a 
traditional orientation. 
For the eight European countries studied, the authors found a positive association 
between the gender index and both the total number of children that men aged 20-44 
expected and the actual number of children ever born for men 35-44. In other words, 
men with more egalitarian attitudes (according to the index they constructed) both 
desired and had more children than men with more traditional gender views. In light of 
the somewhat unexpected direction of the relationship reported, an important question 
arises. Has there been a fundamental reversal in direction of egalitarian attitudes’ 
influence on fertility, or are measurement issues responsible for this finding?   
 
 
3. Examining a similar question with alternative data and measures  
Motivated by the Puur et al. findings, we explored a similar relationship with data from 
the European/World Values Surveys. We proceeded with this endeavor despite the 
obstacles to creating a perfectly parallel analysis. The European/World Values dataset 
comprises surveys from approximately 100 countries conducted over the past two 
decades. We were able to include seven of the eight countries examined in the Puur et 
al. analysis (Austria, Estonia, West Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, and 
Poland); East Germany was excluded because in the most recent European/World 
Values Survey in this country (1997), only 33 men ages 20-44 were surveyed. 
The European/World Values dataset includes a set of five questions combined into 
an index labeled a “Gender Equality Scale” (Inglehart and Norris 2003). World Values 
Surveys specialists Inglehart and Norris (2003) developed the scale items based on 
“those commonly contained in the more comprehensive psychological scales of gender 
equality, tapping attitudes toward politics, the workforce, education, and the family” 
(pages 31-32). Factor analysis revealed that all five items tapped a single dimension, 
with a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.54. 
The scale assesses respondents’ level of agreement with the following five items:   
 
1) On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do. 
2) When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.  
3) A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl. 
4) Do you think a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled, or is 
this not necessary? 
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5) If a woman wants to have a child as a single parent but doesn’t want to 
have a stable relationship with a man, do you approve or disapprove? 
 
Only three of the five items above were included in all of the European countries 
contained in Puur et al.’s analysis. Austria, Italy and the Netherlands only included 
three of the items (numbers 2, 4, and 5 above).   
To be sure, the items above are hardly identical to those used by Puur et al., who 
focused in particular on attitudes toward men’s social roles and less so on attitudes 
toward women’s social roles. That said, given that the World Value Surveys items 
capture at least some underlying attitudes toward gender equality, we decided to 
proceed with the analysis despite the measurement differences.   
The surveys used in the Puur et al. article were conducted between 2000 and 2003. 
In order to increase comparability, we focused primarily on the European/ World 
Values Surveys conducted in 1999, although we used the 1990 survey to explore 
changes in gender attitudes over the decade (Table 1).   
The published findings (Puur et al. 2008) relate both to the intended number of 
children and to the actual number of children ever born to men aged 35-44. Neither 
intended nor expected number of children were measured in the 1999 European/World 
Values Surveys; thus, our comparisons focus on the cumulative number of children ever 
born to men 35-44 years of age.  
 
 
4. Results  
As Table 1 indicates, the short period between 1990 and 1999 witnessed significant 
increases in egalitarian attitudes in all of the surveyed countries except West Germany. 
Particularly dramatic rises occurred in Estonia and Lithuania. As expected, and in 
accordance with Puur et al., our data revealed that the most egalitarian gender 
orientations are found in the Netherlands and Austria and the least egalitarian in Poland 
and Estonia. 
Table 2 contains the mean number of children ever born to men 35-44 by indices 
of gender equality attitudes for both datasets. The contrast in the direction of the 
association is clear: fertility is higher at the egalitarian end of the scale in the Puur et al. 
study, but lower in the European/World Values Survey data. For every country without 
exception, we found an opposite relationship than that found in the previous study.  The 
correlation between the two variables is negative in 6 of the 7 countries – weakly 
positive (but non-significantly so) only in Austria (not shown). The relationship is 
statistically significant in West Germany, Lithuania, Netherlands and Poland.  With 
education included, a significant association remains for Lithuania and West Germany. 
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Table 1: Percent distributions of men’s attitudes toward gender equality  
1990 and 1999 
  Traditional  Intermediate  Egalitarian  Number of men, 20-44 
Austria      
1990  25 42 34 235 
1999  20 29 51 270 
      
Estonia      
1990  65 31 3 266 
1999  26 48 26 221 
      
Italy      
1990  38 37 24 534 
1999  27 38 35 486 
      
Lituania      
1990  69 28 4 249 
1999  20 45 34 242 
      
Netherlands      
1990  10 35 55 236 
1999  5 28 66 232 
      
Poland      
1990  64 21 15 213 
1999  39 36 25 216 
      
West Germany     
1990  23 35 43 426 
1999  30 37 38 362 
      
4/21/2009      
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Table 2: Mean number of children ever born to men ages 35-44 in seven 
European countries by attitude toward gender equality in two studies 
 Published Study (Puur et al. 2008) European/World Values Surveys 
 Traditional Intermediate Egalitarian Traditional Intermediate Egalitarian 
Country       
Austria 1.4 1.7 1.7 1.3 0.9 0.9 
Estonia 1.1 1.9 2.0 1.2 1.3 1.0 
Italy 1.2 1.2 1.5 0.8 0.7 0.5 
Lithuania 1.8 1.8 2.2 1.7 1.4 1.0 
Netherlands 1.1 1.5 1.3 0.8*  0.6 
Poland 1.8 2.1 2.3 1.5 1.1 1.1 
West 
Germany 
0.8 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.0 0.6 
 
*Due to small numbers of Dutch men in these two categories, we combined men with "traditional" and "intermediate" gender attitudes 




To widen the scope of our findings, we conducted the same analysis with all 
developed countries in the European/World Values Survey data, examining the 
association between children ever born to men aged 20-44 and the entire 5-item gender 
index (including the questions 1 and 3 not asked in three of the seven European 
countries). The countries included Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, 
South Korea, Taiwan, and the United States, as well as 23 European countries.   
When using this expanded dataset, we encountered a statistically significant 
negative relationship between egalitarian attitudes of men and the number of children 
ever born for 17 of the 31 countries (not shown). The slope was uniformly negative in 
the other 14 countries, but simply failed to reach a significance level of .05. A similar 
pattern was found when analyses were confined to men aged 35-44, but the relationship 
was statistically significant in only 10 of the 31 countries. Finally, we examined the 
same set of data among women only, and we encountered even stronger results (not 
shown). This analysis of women is not directly relevant to Puur et al.’s findings, which 
focus exclusively on men. Rather, we explored the data in this way to determine 
whether any change in the association of fertility with perceived gender roles might be 
occurring among women. 
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5. Discussion  
This small study was prompted by a recent analysis by Puur et al., 2008, who found 
that, in eight European countries, men with egalitarian gender attitudes both desired and 
had more children than men with more traditional gender attitudes. We were surprised 
by the power, magnitude, and policy implications of these findings, so much that we 
moved to explore a similar research question with an alternate dataset—the 
European/World Value Surveys. Yet in analyzing data from the seven of the same eight 
countries, we reached a very different conclusion. Instead of a positive relationship 
between men’s egalitarian attitudes and fertility, we found—without exception—a 
negative association, not only in the selected European countries but also in a 
considerable number of other developed countries.   
We also wish to draw attention to a recent analysis by Dimiter Philipov (Philipov 
2008), which reported findings from 11 European countries using the same dataset as 
Puur et al. Using a three-fold approach to gender, Philipov reported mixed results 
between gender egalitarian attitudes and fertility. He found no statistically significant 
relationships between the three gender factors and intentions to have a second or higher 
order child. Among women, more modern attitudes were correlated with lower 
intentions to become parents, but the opposite correlation was observed for men in 
several countries. 
 
What accounts for these divergent findings? 
 
These three different sets of results are most likely a result of differences in 
measurement of “gender egalitarianism”. Philipov (2008), for example, divided gender 
issues into three categories: gender-role ideology, consequences for the family, and 
economic consequences. Only one of the four items in the gender-role ideology cluster 
was used by Puur et al. (“It is not good if the man stays at home and cares for the 
children and the woman goes out to work”). Another item in the Puur et al. paper is in 
the “consequences for the family” dimension (“Family life often suffers because men 
concentrate too much on their work”). The third remaining item in their index (“For a 
man the job should be more important than the family”) was not included in any of 
Philipov’s categories. None of the gender items we used in our own analysis are 
verbatim matches to those used by Philipov or Puur et al., although they pertain to 
gender ideology more than to economic or familial consequences. 
As such, our analysis highlights an older, more systemic problem in the broader 
literature: the lack of consensus about how to measure gender equality. Even the label 
for this concept has been in flux (e.g., women’s status, women’s empowerment, gender 
equity), let alone its various components (e.g., marriage systems, access to educational 
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and professional opportunities, participation in household decision-making, shared 
domestic labor, gender ideology attitudes, etc.) (Larsen and Hollos 2003). Other 
scholars have emphasized the importance of domestic labor over paid labor in shaping 
the relationship between gender and fertility; women who participate equally with their 
male partners and peers in the labor force but who still bear the brunt of labor at home 
are likely to want fewer children (McDonald 2000; Torr and Short 2004). As we 
described above, sometimes even the same survey will ask about gender in different 
ways in various countries, underscoring the cultural differences in gender systems and 
adding additional measurement challenges to demographers. 
Further, even if demographers were able to agree on the multiple components of 
gender egalitarianism, challenges persist in how to measure the relationships between 
gender and fertility (Mason 1997). For example, most studies on this topic, including 
the three outlined here, are cross-sectional in nature, limiting our ability to see larger 
changes over time within the same cultural context. Karen Mason has warned against 
measuring gender at the individual, attitudinal level versus the aggregate level, given 
gender’s manifestation in all aspects of society—personal, political, cultural, and 
structural (Mason 1997). What’s more, several scholars have described how gender 
systems condition the impact of other influences on fertility rather than create it outright 
(Chesnais 1996; Mason and Smith 2000). So for example, men’s openness to equal 
sharing of domestic and parenting responsibilities will have a stronger influence on 
fertility outcomes in some settings over others, depending on the overall tenor of the 
gender system in a particular.   
A final problem in comparing and evaluating studies on gender and fertility 
pertains to differences in measures of fertility and not merely differences in measures of 
gender equality. For example, although Puur et al. explored men’s desired as well as 
completed fertility, we were only able to examine children ever born (CEB) with the 
European/World Values Survey. Thus, analyses can also be stymied by non-parallel 
measures of fertility outcomes.  
Thus, we wish to caution readers of Puur et al.’s analysis against drawing the 
universal conclusion that men with more gender egalitarian attitudes desire and have 
more children. Rather, their—and our—results might be best interpreted in the 
following way: some measures of gender egalitarianism in some countries appear to be 
positively associated with higher fertility, while other measures are negatively 
associated. Given the potential importance of the authors’ findings for the future of 
European fertility, such a cautionary interpretation seems wise. 
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